The United States has one of the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenals in the world, with over 4,000 nuclear missiles in its military stockpiles. The US utilizes these weapons for a number of strategic purposes across the globe, with two of the most significant uses being the exertion of international influence and defense of allies via the “nuclear umbrella”. However, the US keeps hundreds of nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert, capable of firing at any moment. This aggressive posture has consequences: the formation of a nuclear arms race with other powerful states and an increasing threat presented by cyberterrorism.
The threat of a nuclear arms race is becoming increasingly severe. One key indication is the US strategy for nuclear containment. Under President Trump, the US strategy for countering the nuclear expansion of Russia and China was simply to outspend them and hope “they came to their senses”. Unfortunately, the outcome has been exactly the opposite. Over the past number of years, Russia and China have expanded the size of their nuclear arsenals. This is a direct response to the US, according to Russian officials, who cited US investment into missile defense as the reason for their investment into more sophisticated missile technology.
This problem is not limited to Russia and China. The escalating game of nuclear brinkmanship with Russia has caused the progressive erosion of non-proliferation norms in the Middle East. This development makes it increasingly likely that powerful nations like Iran or Saudi Arabia could develop nuclear capabilities, which would significantly increase the probability of a regional arms race. Aggressive US nuclear policy has caused a situation where the number of nuclear actors is rapidly increasing, with the probability of a disastrous nuclear miscalculation increasing along with it.
Also, the development of nuclear arsenals are prohibitively expensive, with the cost of the US arsenal exceeding $600 billion over a 10-year period. Unfortunately, military spending trades off with economic growth; economic modeling suggests that over a 20-year period, a 1% increase in military spending reduces a country’s economic growth by 9%.
Another risk with the US’s aggressive nuclear policy is the increasing viability of cyberterrorism. Cyber threats are becoming significantly more sophisticated, and because US nuclear weapons systems may be vulnerable to these attacks, the likelihood of such an attack increases every day. Even worse, military programs tend not to pay adequate consideration even to less dangerous cyber risks. Terrorists do not conform to the traditional incentives around the use of nuclear weapons. The logic of mutually assured destruction states that a nation will never use nuclear weapons on each other because they know a retaliatory strike will follow and the state may be destroyed. However, this logic does not apply to terrorists, who are usually decentralized and willing to die for their cause, meaning a retaliatory strike is not an effective deterrent. A cyberterrorist attack is a serious risk, which, if successful, would result in a nuclear launch likely to kill millions.
In response to these threats, the US should adopt a nuclear No First Use (NFU) policy. An NFU policy is a commitment that the US will not use nuclear weapons preemptively, although a nation with an NFU policy retains their ability to use these weapons in a retaliatory capacity. NFU policies signal to other nations that nuclear weapons are a mechanism for deterrence: to avoid war rather than facilitating it. This change in posture would address both of the problems caused by the US’s current nuclear strategy.
In regards to the problem of nuclear proliferation, much of the problem relates to the perception of US action. The rationale offered by foreign powers for expanding nuclear programs often pertains to the aggressive posture held by the US and the subsequent view that a counterbalance is necessary to deter the US. As a result, the passage of a law that states that the US will only use nuclear weapons in a defensive capacity removes much of that incentive, reducing the likelihood of an arms race.
The adoption of an NFU policy would also address the issue of cyber terrorism. Given that an NFU is a commitment not to act on a first-strike basis, there would be no need to keep missiles on constant hair-trigger alert. This would significantly reduce the probability of a nuclear terrorist act, because it would make it harder for cyberterrorists to launch a nuclear-armed missile. Importantly, adopting an NFU policy does not mean the US is denuclearizing. Use of nuclear weapons under an NFU is still permissible in the event of a confirmed attack on the US or its allies. This allows for the best of both worlds of nuclear policy, as the US maintains the threat of a nuclear response while eliminating much of the risk associated with aggressive policies on nuclear weapons.
Overall, it is clear that some action is necessary because the status quo is untenable. The US’s aggressive nuclear policy encourages a global nuclear arms race and increases the risk of nuclear conflict, either through miscalculation between states or through cyberterrorism. A No First Use policy would address these problems while also maintaining the strategic value of the US nuclear arsenal for deterrence.